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In the philosophical Œvre of Ludwig Wittgenstein explicitly 
ethical remarks appear as scattered islands within the 
ocean of logical and linguistic investigations. The fact that 
precisely these remarks motivate Wittgenstein's 
Denkbewegungen was articulated by the author himself 
several times.1 In the following article we attempt to 
provide hints for the ethical dimension of Wittgenstein's 
"authorial strategy" (Conant, 2000, 175) by reflecting on 
the importance of the question of the meaning of life for 
the development of Wittgenstein's philosophical style of 
thinking. When refering to the "close relationship between 
his life problems and his philosophical way of thinking" 
(DB, 8, my translation), we are not following the impulse of 
reductionist psychologization, but are offering an invitation 
to a reading of Wittgenstein’s philososophy that 
emphasizes the 'tone of voice" (Monk, 2001, 4) of his 
language. 
1. The Problem of Life  
When we become a „terra difficultatis“ (Augustinus, X, XVI, 
25) for ourselves by looking into the mirror of diffuse reflec-
tion and the painful questions of metaphysics make our 
entire life questionable, philosophical thinking organizes an 
attempt to give an answer to the elementary questions of 
our existence. 
Ludwig Wittgenstein's diary notes written when he 
was a volunteer soldier in the First World War give a pic-
ture of a desperate psychological state which provides the 
origin of the metaphysical need that is made to disappear 
at the end of the Tractatus. In relative analogy to Kierke-
gaard, Wittgenstein keeps a continuous journal in which 
biographical and philosophical notes penetrate each other. 
The partial encoding of the entries and the phenomenol-
ogical structure of the diary allows for a remarkable insight 
into Wittgenstein's style of thinking and working; from dia-
ries and notebooks - strictly thought through - the philoso-
phical core, which gives the Tractatus its enigmatical form, 
becomes distilled. Philosophy and biography penetrate 
each other in the form of a doubled bookkeeping. Recto 
and verso of the manuscript mark the two invisibly interact-
ing spheres of the personal and the philosophical. 
In a state of deep disconcertment about the painful 
disruption of human existence, the young Wittgenstein 
asks himself the metaphysical question par excellence:  
„Kann man aber so leben daß das Leben aufhört pro-
blematisch zu sein? Daß man im Ewigen lebt und nicht 
in der Zeit?“ (BEE, Ms 102, 117r [1.6.1915]) 
In asking this question Wittgenstein recapitulates a figure 
of traditional philosophical thought: the idea of an ap-
proach sub specie aeternitatis. The finite nature of human 
understanding is to be abolished in favour of a deeper 
insight into the hidden rules of the world. This is the ex-
pression of a passionate desire to be redeemed by the 
ordering of metaphysical knowledge, wherein the untiring 
longing for the right form of life comes to an end: 
                                                     
1 Two sign posts: CLF, 35: „(…) denn der Sinn des Buches ist ein Ethischer. 
(…) mein Werk bestehe aus zwei Teilen: aus dem der hier vorliegt und aus 
alledem, was ich nicht geschrieben habe und gerade der zweite Teil ist der 
Wichtige. (1919)“ and VB, 511: „Friede in den Gedanken. Das ist das ersehnte 
Ziel, dessen, der philosophiert. (1944)“. 
„Das große Problem, um das sich alles dreht, was ich 
schreibe; ist: Ist a priori, eine Ordnung in der Welt, und 
wenn, ja, worin besteht sie?“ (BEE, Ms 102, 117r 
[1.6.1915]) 
Inner loneliness and depression make the idea of suicide 
possible throughout Wittgenstein's whole life. Suicide is no 
more than the destruction of life (In this way Weininger 
removed the contradictions between his moral ideal and 
human reality). In a conversation with his close friend 
David Hume Pinsent, Wittgenstein said that the care of 
Bertrand Russell ended "nine years of lonely suffering, in 
which he constantly considered suicide”. (Monk, 2004, 57, 
my translation) 
There is sufficient autobiographical and biographical 
evidence to show, that also for the rest of his life, Wittgen-
stein’s inner moral struggle with his own imperfection and 
continuously growing feelings of meaninglessness never 
came to a standstill. Throughout his entire life Ludwig Witt-
genstein continues to search for the right form of life. Tor-
mented with inner strain and restlessness, in permanently 
new drafts he will try to make vanish the problems of phi-
losophy and the problem of life, which stand in a complex 
relationship to each other.  
In the Tractatus we come across the attempt to give 
the problems a logically strict form in order to make them 
dissolve on the critical point of their condensation. 
2. The Vanishing of the Problem?  
At a decisive point in the Tractatus the question of the 
meaning of life gains paradigmatic importance for Wittgen-
stein’s philosophical method:  
„Die Lösung des Problems des Lebens merkt man am 
Verschwinden dieses Problems.  
(Ist nicht das der Grund, warum Menschen, denen der 
Sinn des Lebens nach langen Zweifeln klar wurde, war-
um diese dann nicht sagen konnten, worin dieser Sinn 
bestand?)“(TLP, 6.521)2 
As a reaction to the logic of the problem of life – which is 
the prime example for the paradoxical nature of philoso-
phical problems – Wittgenstein carries out the radically 
therapeutic project of a final distinction between sense and 
nonsense (TLP, p. 9). The philosophical questions turn out 
to be unsolvable, i.e. meaningless in the medium in which 
they are posed to us – language.  
The author of the Tractatus wants to make the prob-
lems vanish by leading the reader to the understanding 
that their existence is based on a meaningless way of ask-
ing, which is inherent to the limited logic of our language. 
The original dissolution of the basic question of ethics 
(TLP, 6.521) turns out to be the paradigmatic birthplace of 
the elucidative method (Conant, 2000 et 2002b) of the 
Tractatus’ sentences. Following the instructions given by 
the author, their elucidative function consists of creating an 
awareness of their fundamental meaninglessness in the 
                                                     
2 This central remark stems from the third diary (note) book (Ms 103, 13r 
[6.7.1916]) and can be found both in the Prototractatus (Ms 104) and in all 3 
typescripts of the Tractatus (Ts 202, Ts 203, Ts 204). In Wiener Typoskript 
des Tractatus (Ts 204) these sentences even mark the end of the carrying out. 




reader’s mind. In the reader’s consciousness the Trac-
tarian sentences converge – when they are strictly thought 
through – into their own meaninglessness. The narrative 
structure makes of the text a mirror in which the reader 
finds herself in the situation of the monkey that recognizes 
itself for the first time in his own mirror image. „Ein Bild 
hielt uns gefangen.“ (PU, § 115) 
The convergence of the Tractatus shows us that 
every attempt to transcend the borders of our language 
remains unconscious of the limited nature of human 
thought and existence. In the end the attempt to leave the 
place of the absolute empty and to ascribe to it an inex-
pressible and unrecognizable existence, unmasks itself as 
no more than the final residue of the metaphysical spirit of 
abstraction. This spirit wants to hold onto at least the pos-
sibility of truth about the world and stops on the last rung 
of the Tractarian ladder without throwing it away. (TLP, 
6.54) 
The ethical dimension of our existence can not be 
positively determined in a definitive system of philosophy. 
The Tractatus shows that the logic of our language does 
not meaningfully permit substantial metaphysics. Every 
attempt to transcend the border drawn by the author inevi-
tably leads to self betrayal and intellectual dishonesty. In 
this sense the Tractatus has limited the ethical „gleichsam 
von Innen her “ (CLF, 35). 
The Tractatus ends with its author remaining silent. 
We have made the problems therapeutically vanish. But 
was the therapy sustainably successful? Is one disillusion-
ing view into the mirror of our own vanities enough? Is one 
experience of climbing over the ladder of our inclination to 
intellectual hypocrisy enough? Can our metaphysical need 
be eased by once and forever recognizing the meaning-
lessness of its query?  
The escatological demand of the Tractatus, „die 
Probleme im Wesentlichen endgültig gelöst zu haben“ 
(TLP, p. 10), and its orchestrated aesthetics unmask an 
inconsistency. The weight of the world can not be weighed 
by reference to logic, because the latter operates inside 
the world. The problems are not seized upon deep enough 
(i.e. in their real Gestalt; Ms 123, 9v!) in order to implement 
the therapeutic act within the reader’s consciousness. The 
pathos of the desire to overcome metaphysics (TLP, 6.54) 
continues to express the pathological spirit of theory. The 
language of the text remains enclosed within the solipsistic 
cocoon of logics. It seems as if the author of the Tractatus 
logico-philosophicus when using an intellectually designed 
therapy method (Cahill, 2004, 54) has fallen victim to his 
own verdict: 
„Die Grenzen meiner Sprache bedeuten die Grenzen 
meiner Welt.“ (TLP, 5.6) 
3. From Monologue to Polylogue: From 
Logical Form to the Form of Life  
Wittgenstein’s time as an elementary teacher in the area in 
which we are now gathered together was no more than the 
attempt to realize the theory of his order of silence, in 
which the Tractatus had culminated. The ambition to es-
tablish the unity of theory and practise – life and language 
– expresses one aspect of the ethical dimension of his 
style of philosophizing. His human and pedagogical failure, 
which provoked severe inner doubts and serious suicidal 
tendencies, were the prelude to Wittgenstein’s return to 
philosophy. It appears that he felt that he had not definitely 
solved the problems. 
Similarly to the therapeutic method of the Tractatus, 
which had originated in the mirror of an innovative variant 
to make the problem of life vanish, we also find material in 
the Nachlass, which contains a paradigmatic remark for 
the morphogenesis of Wittgenstein’s philosophical style on 
the same subject:  
„Die Lösung des Problems, das Du im Leben siehst, ist 
eine Art zu leben, die das Problemhafte zum Verschwin-
den bringt. Daß das Leben problematisch ist, heißt, daß 
dein Leben nicht in die Form des Lebens paßt. Du mußt 
dann Dein Leben ändern, und paßt es in die Form, dann 
verschwindet das Problematische.“ (BEE, 118, 17r - 17v 
[27.8.1937]).  
The author of the Tractatus has enclosed the natural plu-
rality of our linguistic phenomena of our In-der-Welt-sein 
into the solipsistic narrowness of the logical room and fol-
lowed the logical form of a strictly linear and systematic 
therapy method. In the transition to the Philosophical In-
vestigations, he opens windows to the linguistic polyphony 
of divergent forms of life. This opening of windows makes 
what can be thought visible, depending on the direction in 
language from which one is coming. Wittgenstein’s atonal 
philosophical composition no longer expresses a dogmati-
cally narrowed desire for harmony (i.e. the overweighing of 
logic). It shows that there is no extraordinary grammatical 
position from whose archimedean point all doubts and 
contradictions dissolve. The therapeutic method is now 
adjusted to the dialogical form of real life - to the condition 
of language usage of everyday life – and no longer follows 
the monological form of an abstract ideal of language. The 
logocentric form of the Tractarian therapy was abandoned 
in the grammatical purgatory of a gradual transition period 
(Pichler, 2004, 132-142 et 175)3 in favour of a polyphonic 
treatment of the illnesses of thinking, that language con-
tains for us; a treatment which is orientated by the real 
forms of speech. 
In the Investigations we follow the course of a 
circum-flexive polylog, that is adjusted to empirical lan-
guage usage instead of holding onto a theory of an es-
sence of language in its aesthetical core. It is not one sin-
gle fundamental tractatus, but a plurality of textual micro-
entities that creates the missing consciousness of our be-
ing entangled in the grammar of language: 
„Es gibt nicht eine Methode der Philosophie, wohl aber 
gibt es Methoden, gleichsam verschiedene Therapien.“ 
(BEE, Ms 116, 186 [1.9.1937]) 
Wittgenstein’s last attempt, his „philosophische[n] Ge-
danken in eine Reihe zu ordnen“ (BEE, Ms 117, 112), 
leads him to an inevitable approximation to the form of life 
that against our will proves to be a permanent attempt and 
hence always remains fragmentary. 
4. From the Final Solution to an Endless 
Denkbewegung: Laboro in Me Ipso 
Within the internal therapeutics of Wittgenstein’s practice 
of philosophizing, the idea of a final solution becomes an 
endless Denkbewegung circulating in small loops around 
the subject who is meditating on her linguistic references. 
The natural aesthetics of the Philosophical Investigations 
                                                     
3 Alois Pichler argues convincingly that the transformation of Wittgenstein’s 
style of thinking took place in late autumn 1936 and consisted of a morpho-
genesis from a linearly systematic to a polyphonically open representation of 
his thoughts. There is no sharp division but a complex relationship between 
inner continuity and discontinuity. 




reveals the ethical sense where the indirect message of 
the Tractatus appears to have failed.  
The ethical demand, which Wittgenstein’s activity as 
a writer requires from each individual reader, consists of 
interacting with the questions posed by the Investigations 
instead of taking the text as a positive textbook. The clear-
ing of our individual, grammatical confusions requires of us 
that we confront the blind spots of our thinking and tran-
scend our borders: 
“I don’t try to make you believe something, you don’t be-
lieve but to make you do something you won’t do.” (Witt-
gentein after Rhees, 1970, 43) 
As pivotal points which remain out of sight, they reveal the 
unexpressed presuppositions which compose the back-
ground in front of which what we say, think or do becomes 
meaningful. 
Wittgenstein’s polyphonically open therapeutics 
transfers the centre of its philosophical explorations from 
the problems to the origin of the problems: the sharpening 
of consciousness - via philosophizing – of grammatical 
obsessions and illusions turns out to be a wrestling match 
with our own individual language. „Arbeit an Einem selbst. 
An der eigenen Auffassung. Daran, wie man die Dinge 
sieht. (Und was man von ihnen verlangt.)“ (VB, 472)4.  
Our search for truth about the world had its original 
starting point in the problematic question regarding who 
we are; here we close the circle of natural dialectics – 
which in the history of Western Philosophy has so often 
been artificially interrupted by θεωρια – when we transform 
our Selves:  
„Revolutionär wird der sein, der sich selbst revolutionie-
ren kann.“ (VB, 513) 
Depending on what direction in language one comes from, 
one will perceive the rabbit or the duck (PU, p. 520) from 
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s ‚tone of voice’. But indeed there is – 
and that is the suggestion of this essay – sufficient reason 
to view Wittgenstein’s philosophical activity as an expres-
sion of an ethical demand whose aim is to guide us from 
our personal standpoint towards a more profound under-
standing of ourselves.  
                                                     
4 BEE, Ms 109, 174: „Es ist eine Haupttätigkeit der Philosophie vor falschen 
Vergleichen zu warnen. Vor (den) falschen Gleichnissen zu warnen, die unse-
rer Ausdrucksweise – ohne dass wir uns dessen ganz bewußt sind – zu Grun-
de liegen. Ich glaube unsere Methode ähnelt hier der Psychoanalyse die auch 
Unbewußtes bewußt und damit unschädlich machen will und ich glaube daß 
diese Ähnlichkeit keine rein äußerliche ist.“. 
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